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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
Robert Barker, the appellant, was the owner of farm land 
situated in Carbon County and shares of water stock in the 
Schofield Reservoir, also known as the Price River Water Users 
Association. The shares of water stock enabled Barker to 
irrigate the land and use it for the cultivation of crops. (TR. 
153-155; 178; Exs. 24 and 25) In December of 1979, Barker met 
Roger Olson, a real estate agent with Farm & Ranch Realty 
Company of Provo. Olson had contacted Barker to inquire as to 
his interest in selling the farm land or water stock and to 
obtain a listing agreement for the property. Barker declined to 
list the property with Olson. During their conversation, Barker 
expressed his interest in acquiring ranch property. (TR. 
61; 157) 
Roger Olson was a dental patient of respondent, Dr. Larry 
Francis of Provo and generally knew that he owned an interest in 
ranch property situated in Carbon and Duchesne counties. In 
January of 1980, Olson discussed the ranch property, known as 
Nine Mile Ranch, with Dr. Larry Francis and his brother, Dr. 
Howard Francis. (TR. 17-20; 63; 363) The Francis1 desired 
to sell the ranch property for $600,000. (TR. 27; 64; 3 63) 
Olson obtained authorization from Dr. Howard Francis to show the 
property to prospective purchasers. Dr. Howard Francis and Roger 
Olson further agreed that upon sale of the ranch property, Olson 
would receive a commission. (TR. 63; 337) The Francis1 were 
investors in real estate, having bought and- sold several proper-
ties throughout the State of Utah. (TR. 17-19) 
After securing the authorization to show the ranch property 
and to receive a commission for sale thereof, Olson contacted 
Barker about the ranch. He spent a day showing Barker the 
Francis ranch property. (TR. 64) Thereafter, Barker indicated 
to Olson his interest in the ranch property and on February 27, 
1980, an Earnest Money Agreement was prepared by Olson and signed 
by Barker. The Earnest Money Agreement provided that the ranch 
property was valued at $600,000 and that Barker offered to 
purchase it by paying $1,000 earnest money along with 80 acres of 
his farm land and a number of shares of his Schofield Reservoir 
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water stock. (TR. 66; 160; Exs. 1 and 27; Addendum - Exhibit 
"A") 
Olson took the Earnest Money Agreement to Larry and Howard 
Francis and they made a written counter-proposal on it and had 
Olson return it to Barker. (TR. 21; 67) Written negotiations on 
the Earnest Money Agreement between Barker and the Francis1 con-
tinued, ultimately culminating in final terms written on the 
agreement acceptable to all parties dated April 21, 1980. (TR. 
67-70; 161-161; Ex. 1) The words "Agree to above" were written 
on the agreement at that time and it was signed by Robert 
Barker, Howard Francis and Larry Francis. (TR. 67-70; 161-162; 
Ex. 1) 
Several days later, Barker retained Therald Jensen, an 
attorney from Price, to prepare a deed and to secure title 
insurance for the closing. (TR. 162-220) Mr. Jensen ordered a 
title search and title insurance. (TR. 223) Olson retained Dan 
Keller, an attorney from Price, to prepare the closing documents 
for the Francis1. He had been authorized by the Francis1 to 
secure and retain the services of someone to prepare the neces-
sary documents for closing. (TR. 29; 35; 162; 260-262) Mr. 
Keller ordered a title search and title insurance. (TR. 262) 
Since the title search and issuance of title insurance 
could not be completed by the May 1, 1980, closing date, Mr. 
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Jensen wrote a letter to the Francis1 and suggested a June 10, 
1980 closing date. (TR. 222; Ex. 5) Failing to receive a reply 
from the Francis1, Jensen wrote them again on July 16, 1980. 
(TR. 327; Ex. 6) The Francis1 did not reply to Jensen on 
either occasion, instead Dr. Howard Francis wrote to Barker on 
July 28, 1980 and later went to the Barkers1 home in August of 
1980 in an attempt to modify certain provisions of the Earnest 
Money Agreement earlier agreed to by him, Dr. Larry Francis and 
Robert Barker. (TR. 32-35; 38-42; Ex. 7) He was primarily 
interested in retaining the $10,000 lease payment on the ranch 
coming due on November 1, 1980 from Gary Sprouse. (TR. 38-42) 
Terms of compromise were later proposed by Mr. Jensen to the 
Francis1 and their attorney, Mr. Taylor of Spanish Fork, in order 
to carry out the agreement without costly litigation to enforce 
it; however, in the end, the Francis1 declined to go forward. 
(TR. 257-258; Exs. 8, 10, 12 and 14) 
Barker filed a Complaint in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court on August 22, 1983 seeking specific performance of the 
Earnest Money Agreement against Dr. Howard Francis, Deanne 
Tanner Francis, Dr. Larry Francis and Ann Banks Francis. (R. 
1-15) The Complaint was later amended seeking specific perfor-
mance and damages. (R. 42-45) An Answer to the first Complaint 
was filed by the defendants as was an Answer to the Amended 
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Complaint. (R. 21-22; 46-48) Discovery was taken by the 
parties and the case was tried without a jury before Judge Boyd 
Bunnell on March 7 and 8, 1985. (R. 155-159) 
The court ruled that the Earnest Money Agreement was an 
enforceable contract between Barker and Dr. Howard Francis and 
Dr. Larry Francis. Specific performance of the land contract was 
not ordered because the court found that it could not be enforced 
against Deanne Tanner Francis, the wife of Dr. Howard Francis, 
since she had not signed the contract nor had she, the court 
held, authorized her husband to act as her agent when he signed 
the contract. The court found that Deanne Tanner Francis and Ann 
Banks Francis each owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the 
ranch property. No finding was made concerning whether Ann Banks 
Francis had authorized her husband, Dr. Larry Francis, to act as 
her agent when he signed the contract. The court further ruled 
that Robert Barker was entitled to damages for Dr. Howard Francis 
and Dr. Larry Francis1 breach of the contract and awarded Barker 
nominal damages of $1.00. The court found he had not presented 
evidence to establish loss of the benefit of the bargain contract 
damages. He was awarded costs and attorney's fees, to be 
established at a later hearing. (R. 173-177) 
Reasonable attorney's fees and costs were awarded in the 
sum of $22,126.80 at a subsequent hearing. (R. 229) The court 
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later modified its ruling to hold that Dr. Larry Francis, the 
husband of Ann Banks Francis, did not act as her agent when 
signing the contract and the court dismissed Ann Banks Francis 
and Deanne Tanner Francis entirely from the judgment. (R. 
234-240) 
Mr. Barker filed an appeal from the trial court's ruling on 
assessment of damages to this court. (R. 224) Subsequently the 
respondents, Dr. Howard Francis and Dr. Larry Francis, filed a 
cross-appeal to this court. (R. 250) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In cases of equity, the Supreme Court exercises a broad 
scope of review that covers both questions of law and questions 
of fact. Where the trial court has based its ruling on a 
misapplication of the law, the Supreme Court may rectify the 
error or where the occasion warrants, the Court may fashion its 
own remedy according to the demands of justice. 
The trial court erroneously denied the appellant the remedy 
of specific performance of the enforceable provisions of the 
land contract. A proper remedy for this action is partial 
specific performance ordering the conveyance of the appellant's 
farm land and water stock to the respondents, Dr. Howard Francis 
and Dr. Larry Francis, in exchange for $600,000, because they are 
unable to convey their ranch land to the appellant due to their 
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own actions. $600,000 represents the purchase price appellant 
was to receive for his land and stock. The appellant will 
receive adequate compensation for the respondents' breach of 
contract only by this remedy. 
Any questions concerning the values of the appellant's 
property or the respondents' property may be determined by the 
trial court on remand for further proceedings in the event 
partial specific performance of the contract cannot be ordered 
and the appellant is left to monetary damages as his sole remedy 
for the respondents1 breach of contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EQUITY REVIEW ALLOWS AN APPELLATE COURT 
TO REVIEW BOTH QUESTIONS OF LAW AND 
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND TO SUBSTITUTE 
ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
An action for specific performance is an equitable action. 
Cook v. Gardner. 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963). In cases 
of equity, the Supreme Court exercises a broad scope of review 
encompassing both questions of the law and questions of fact. 
Matter of Hock's Estate. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982). The court 
stated in Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980): 
In cases of equity, this court is authorized 
to exercise a broad scope of review encompas-
sing both questions of law and questions of 
fact. While we have recognized the trial 
court's advantageous position in relation to 
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questions of fact, when the trial court has 
based its ruling upon a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the law, where a correct 
one would have produced a different result, 
the party adversely affected is entitled to 
have the error rectified in a proper adjudi-
cation under principles of law. 
It is the duty and prerogative of the Supreme Court, where 
the occasion warrants, to substitute its own judgment for that 
of the trial court and to fashion its own remedy according to 
the demands of justice. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d 1017 
(Utah 1982). In Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), 
the court stated: 
This court is charged with the review of 
both facts and law in equity decisions, and 
may, where the occasion warrants, substitute 
its own judgment for that of the trial court 
and fashion its own remedy according to the 
demands of justice. 
The court's broad power should be exercised in the case at 
hand to apply the appropriate equitable remedies in order to 
grant the relief requested by the appellant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PARTIAL 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND AWARDING 
MONETARY DAMAGES OF ONLY $1.00. 
The trial court ruled that the Earnest Money Agreement was 
an enforceable contract between the appellant, Robert Barker, 
and two of the respondents, Dr. Howard Francis and Dr. Larry 
Francis. Specific performance of the land contract, which would 
have exchanged the appellant's farm land and shares of water 
stock for the respondents1 ranch property, was denied by the 
trial court because of its ruling that Ann Banks Francis and 
Deanne Tanner Francis were each owners of an undivided one-fourth 
interest in the ranch property and neither of them had signed the 
contract or agreed to it. Denying mutual specific performance, 
the trial court determined that the appellant was entitled to 
monetary damages for the breach of contract based on loss of the 
benefit of the bargain calculated by the difference between the 
market value of the respondents' land and the market value of the 
appellant's land and water stock. Determining that the appellant 
failed to establish loss of the benefit of the bargain damages, 
the court awarded only nominal damages of $1.00. 
The damages for breach of the land exchange contract sought 
by the appellant, under circumstances wherein one party can 
perform and the other party cannot convey any property, has not 
heretofore been ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court. This is a 
case of first impression. Understandably, few cases concerning 
land exchange contracts reach the appellate level since contracts 
of that type are fairly uncommon and those which have reached 
the appellate level in other jurisdictions have not involved a 
breaching party unable to convey any property and a non-breaching 
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party willing to convey and accept the contract dollar figure 
for his property. 
The appellate decisions concerning specific performance of 
exchange of land contracts have developed the general rule of law 
that an exchange of land contract may be specifically enforced 
in the same manner as a sale of land contract. The rule is 
stated in 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance § 119, (1973) as 
follows: 
A contract for the exchange of real estate 
may be specifically enforced the same as one 
for an ordinary sale. The ordinary rules in 
regard to specific performance will be 
applied to a contract of this type. 
There is no material difference between an 
exchange and the sale of lands with respect 
to the principles in which a court of equity 
must proceed in compelling or refusing 
specific performance. In either case, the 
agreement must be fair and just in all 
parts, and founded on an adequate consider-
ation; if the agreement is wanting in either 
of these essential elements, the court will 
not interfere. 
The general rules of specific performance as applied to the 
case at hand demonstrate that the appellant is entitled to 
enforce conveyance of his land and stock in exchange for its 
purchase price as established by the contract at $600,000. 
As a party to an exchange of land contract, the appellant 
is in effect a vendor of the land and stock he is selling or 
exchanging. The well-established precedent in real estate sales 
contract decisions is that a vendor or a purchaser may obtain 
specific performance. See, Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1975); Wagner v. Anderson, 250 P.2d 577 (Utah 1952); Streater v. 
White, 613 P.2d 187 (Wash. App. 1980); Wittick v. Miles, 274 
Or. 1, 545 P.2d 121 (1976); Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortq. & 
Securities Company, 432 P. 2d 603 (Ala. 1967). As a general 
rule, specific performance is available to the vendor as well as 
the vendee because the remedy is deemed mutual and compensation 
based on the loss of the benefit of bargain is deemed inadequate 
to compensate the vendor for the breach of contract. The rules 
are stated in 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance, § 115, (1973). 
It is well-settled that the vendor in a 
contract for the sale of land, when fully 
able, ready and willing to comply with his 
contract by conveying the title and quality 
of land which he contracted to sell, may 
obtain in his favor a decree of specific 
performance of the contract, although the 
relief actually obtained by him is the 
recovery of money - the purchase price - for 
which he may also have a remedy by action at 
law. 
The remedy by specific performance is 
deemed to be mutual as between vendor and 
vendee. It has sometimes been said, however, 
that equity compels specific performance in 
favor of the vendor, not on the ground of 
mutuality of remedy but on the ground that 
compensation in damages, measured by the 
difference in price, as ascertained by the 
market value and by the contract, is not 
regarded as adequate indemnity for the 
nonfulfillment of the contract. 
11 
The appellant, as vendor of his 80 acres of land and 18 0 
shares
 m of water stock, is entitled to specific performance and 
is entitled to receive the purchase price promised by the 
respondents, $600,000. That sum is clearly stated in the 
contract, as it reads "The total purchase price of ($600,000)". 
(TR. 21; Ex. 1) 
The ability of the appellant to perform was established at 
trial by his testimony (TR. 163) and the introduction into 
evidence of his deed for the sale of the farm land and bill of 
sale for the sale of the water stock. (TR. 167; Exs. 29 and 30) 
It is no defense that since the appellant did not perform prior 
to bringing suit that he cannot obtain specific performance. 
The appellant was not required to perform by conveying his 
property prior to bringing suit when he knew the respondents 
were not going to perform. It is sufficient that he was ready, 
willing and able to perform but did not because it would have 
been a useless act. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980). 
The court stated in Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 18 6 P. 437 
(1919) : 
It is a basic premise of equity that the law 
will never compel a person to do that which 
is vain or useless. 
A proper order from the trial court would have enabled the 
appellant to convey his property to the respondents pursuant to 
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the terms of the contract. In exchange, the appellant should 
have received from the respondents $600,000, as established 
by the terms of the contract as the purchase price for the 
appellant's property and stock. Such an order would have been 
consistent with the appellant's rights as a vendor to the 
exchange of land contract. He is entitled to specific perform-
ance of his property in exchange for its agreed purchase price. 
Case law precedent firmly establishes a vendor's right to 
specific performance of a land sales contract. Equity compels 
specific performance on the sound basis that damages measured by 
the difference between market value and contract price would not 
provide adequate compensation for .the injured non-breaching 
party to the contract. 
Unable to grant mutual specific performance, because the 
respondents cannot convey the ranch property, the court may grant 
partial specific performance. The exchange of land contract 
should be specifically enforced in part so as to order the 
appellant to convey his land and stock with compensation based 
on the purchase price of $600,000. No sound reason in principle 
or authority exists to deny such equitable relief to the non-
breaching party. 
The objective of granting equitable relief by way of 
partial specific performance is to do justice to the extent 
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feasible. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 358, Comment A. 
An order can be fashioned by this court or on remand to the trial 
court requiring the appellant to convey and ordering the breach-
ing respondents to pay for the appellant's land and water stock 
for the contract dollar figure of $600,000. Such an order 
serves justice, it poses no enforcement problem and it would not 
be overly burdensome to either party. 
Section 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, autho-
rizes the use of individually fashioned partial specific perfor-
mance orders. It states: 
Form of Order and Other Relief. 
(1) An order of specific performance or an 
injunction will be so drawn as best to 
effectuate the purpose for which the contract 
was made and on such terms as justice 
requires. It may not be absolute in form 
and the performance that it requires need 
not be identical to that due under the 
contract. 
(2) If specific performance or an injunction 
is denied as to the part of the performance 
that is due, it may nevertheless be granted 
as to the remainder. 
(3) In addition to specific performance or 
an injunction, damages and other relief may 
be awarded in the same preceding and an 
indemnity against future harm may be re-
quired. 
Ordering the relief granted by the appellant is within the 
equitable power of this court. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 
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(Utah 1980) and Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). The 
order would not result in an injustice to either party. Rather 
it would fulfill the demands of justice and provide the appellant 
with the only relief that can place him, the injured non-breach-
ing party, in as near the position he would have been if the 
contract had been carried out by the respondents. Limiting the 
appellant to damages based on loss of the benefit of the bargain 
does not provide him with adequate or just compensation. 
Appellant's bargain from the contract encompasses both the 
selling or exchange of his property and the attainment of 
$600,000. To maintain that he is entitled to the difference in 
market value between his property and the respondents' could very 
well provide him with no recovery against the breaching parties. 
That would be an inadequate award, depriving him of any benefit 
from the agreement and allowing the respondents, Dr. Howard 
Francis and Dr. Larry Francis, to breach the contract without any 
detrimental results. The social policy of upholding the integ-
rity of contracts would be diminished by such an order. Specific 
performance is the appropriate remedy when damages would not 
adequately compensate the injured party. Delivery Service and 
Transfer Company v. Heiner Equipment & Supply Company, 635 P.2d 
21 (Utah 1981). The remedy sought by the appellant would 
combine specific performance and damages to adequately and 
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properly compensate the appellant for the breach of contract by 
the respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has demonstrated that the trial court errone-
ously denied him the remedy of partial specific performance of 
the enforceable land contract, A proper remedy would have 
ordered specific performance of the land and water stock of the 
appellant in exchange for $600,000 since the respondents could 
not convey their ranch land due to their own actions. This court 
has within its power, while reviewing an equitable proceeding, to 
rectify the result of the trial court or to otherwise fashion its 
own remedy that meets the demands of justice. In this instance, 
justice is served by requiring conveyance by the appellant and 
payment by the respondents. In the event this Court's examina-
tion of the law and facts determines that the trial court 
appropriately ruled against specific performance, in whole or 
part, the appellant is entitled to monetary damages based on the 
breach of the contract by the respondents. To determine the 
appropriate amount of damages, this case should be remanded to 
the trial court with instructions for a new trial or hearing on 
the issue of determining appellant's damages. 
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